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ARGUMENT
I.

GETTLING WAS ILLEGALLY DETAINED, AND THE
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY
WAS ILLEGAL

Subsequent to briefing in this matter the United States Supreme Court issued a
decision in Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009).
Johnson was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. At the time of
the stop, police had no reason to suspect the vehicle's occupants were guilty of other
criminal activity. The vehicle had three occupants and there were three officers present.
The occupants were instructed to keep their hands visible. They were also asked about
the presence of weapons and all responded in the negative. Id at 784.
While one officer was getting the driver's license and registration/insurance
information on the vehicle, another officer attended to Johnson. She observed he was
1

wearing clothing that was consistent with gane membership, and that he had a seamier in
his jacket pocket. She wanted to question Johnson away from the other passenger m
order to learn more about any possible gang membership, so she asked him to get out of
the car. He complied. Because she suspected he may have a weapon on him, she patted
him down for officer safety. She felt the butt of a gun near his waist. He began to
straggle and was placed in handcuffs. Johnson was charged with possession of a weapon
by a restricted person. M a t 784-85.
After the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed Johnson's conviction, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Arizona Court
of x^ppeals and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. Id at 785,
788.
The specific issue the U.S. Court addressed was the "authority of police officers to
'stop and frisk' a passenger in a motor vehicle temporarily seized upon police detection
of a traffic infraction." Id. at 784. The Court unanimously concluded that:
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for
investigation of a traffic violation. The temporaiy seizure of driver and passengers
ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.
Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the scene,
and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. See Brendlin [v.
California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007)].
An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the
traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into
2

something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not
measurably extend the duration of the stop. See Muehler v. Mena. 544 U.S. 93,
100-101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L Ed.2d 299 (2005).
Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788.
Gettlmg asserts that this case is factually distinct from Johnson. In Johnson, the
frisk which resulted in the discovery of the gun, was done while another officer was
speaking with the driver of the vehicle and was obtaining a driver's license and
information on the vehicle's registration and insurance. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 784-85.
Accordingly, the traffic stop was ongoing and the questioning and pat down of Johnson
did not measurably extend the duration of that stop.
In this case, however, the opposite is true. Here, the vehicle was stopped for lane
violations (R. 194: 11). But by the time the vehicle was searched and drugs were
discovered, the driver of the vehicle was airested due to outstanding warrants and had
been placed in a patrol car (R. 194: 6-7). Officer Radmall testified:
I arrested the driver [Steve Canals], removed him from the vehicle, placed
him in mine. I went back and advised both occupants of the vehicle that I was
going to run my dog. I'm a K9 handler. I was going to run the K9 around the
vehicle. I noticed a little bit of furtive movement from Mr. Gettling. He acted
nervous about it.
I noticed when I placed the other individual in my vehicle he was doing
some kind of movement in the backseat. At that point, I decided to remove them
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both from the vehicle. I had a UVSC officer backing me up. 1 had them stand off
with her while 1 did the K9 sniff
(R. 194: 6-7). Gettling's movements caused Radmall concerns over weapons and officer
safety (R. 194: 22, 24, 25). After Childs and Gettling exited the vehicle, they were patted
them down for weapons, then had them stand by the other officer (R. 194: 24. 25. 26).
Radmall admitted that at Childs and Gettling were not free to leave (R. 194: 14).
The dog alerted on two different locations and Radmall spoke with the vehicle's
owner (the other passenger, Amber Childs) and told her he would be having the dog
search the inside of the vehicle (R. 194: 7-8). Childs "said she was fine with it... there
shouldn't be anything in the car" (R. 194. 8). The dog indicated on the backseat of the
vehicle, beneath some luggage. Radmall removed the luggage and underneath found a
hard glass case. He opened it and found paraphernalia and methamphetamine (R. 194:
8). Childs and Canals denied ownership. When Gettling was questioned about it, he
said, "Don't make me tell you. Don't make me say it." Gettling also asked Radmall to
remove some items from the luggage to give to Childs (R. 194: 10).
When Canals was arrested on the outstanding warrants, no drugs had been located
(R. 194: 12). Moreover, at that time Radmall had no reason to believe that any of the
vehicle's occupants was using drags (Id.). Defense counsel then asked, "And so, at that
point, you went to do a search of the vehicle pursuant to the arrest of Mr. Canals?" (R.
194: 12). Radmall replied, "Actually, I did a free air sniff of the vehicle" (R. 194: 12).
Radmall explained the "free air sniff as follows: "A free air sniff is that I have the right
to walk my dog around the vehicle. The air around the vehicle is free. I don't have to
4

have probable cause to do that. On a stop I already made an arrest out of, and there was
no legal way for them to remove that vehicle, neither one of them [Childs and Gettlmg]
had driver's licenses, that vehicle is free for me to walk my K9 around at any time'* (R.
194: 20).
Gettling asserts that the lawful traffic stop should have ended with the arrest of the
driver, Steve Canals. At this point, Gettlmg should not have been further detained, but
should have been free to leave the scene. At this stage, there was no reasonable suspicion
of other criminal activity. He could have been patted down for weapons—as he was—in
order to allay any concerns for officer safety. Officer Radmalfs inquiry into matters
unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop—his free air sniff of the vehicle and
subsequent sniff inside the vehicle, done while Gettling was still detained, measurably
extended the duration of the stop, and therefore, constitute an unlawful detention.
Moreover, the K9 search/sniff of the vehicle in this case is similarly not allowable under
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005),
because in this case, the deployment of the K9 impermissibly expanded the scope of
detention.
Accordingly, because the detention of Gettling exceeded what is allowable under
Johnson, this Court should reverse his conviction and the denial of his motion to
suppress.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests thrs court to reverse
the denial of his motion to suppress and vacate his conditional Seiy plea, and remand this
case to the Fourth District Court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of February, 2009.

Margaret P. Lindsa
Counsel for Appenant
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